A New Protocol and Lower Bounds for Quantum Coin Flipping by Ambainis, Andris
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
02
04
02
2v
1 
 4
 A
pr
 2
00
2
A New Protocol and Lower Bounds for Quantum
Coin Flipping
Andris Ambainis∗
School of Mathematics
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, NJ 08540
e-mail: ambainis@ias.edu
Abstract
We present a new protocol and two lower bounds for quantum coin
flipping. In our protocol, no dishonest party can achieve one outcome
with probability more than 0.75. Then, we show that our protocol is
optimal for a certain type of quantum protocols.
For arbitrary quantum protocols, we show that if a protocol achieves
a bias of at most ǫ, it must use at least Ω(log log 1
ǫ
) rounds of commu-
nication. This implies that the parallel repetition fails for quantum coin
flipping. (The bias of a protocol cannot be arbitrarily decreased by run-
ning several copies of it in parallel.)
1 Introduction
In many cryptographic protocols, there is a need for random bits that are com-
mon to both parties. However, if one of parties is allowed to generate these
random bits, this party may have a chance to influence the outcome of the pro-
tocol by appropriately picking the random bits. This problem can be solved by
using a cryptographic primitive called coin flipping.
Definition 1 A coin flipping protocol with ǫ bias is one where Alice and Bob
communicate and finally decide on a value c ∈ {0, 1} such that
• If both Alice and Bob are honest, then Prob(c = 0) = Prob(c = 1) = 1/2.
• If one of them is honest (follow the protocol), then, for any strategy of the
dishonest player, Prob(c = 0) ≤ 1/2 + ǫ, Prob(c = 1) ≤ 1/2 + ǫ.
∗Supported by NSF Grant CCR-9987845 and the State of New Jersey. Part of this work
done while at University of California, Berkeley (supported by Microsoft Research Graduate
Fellowship and NSF grant CCR-9800024) and IBM Almaden.
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Classically, coin flipping was introduced by Blum[6]. Classical coin flipping
protocols are based on computational assumptions such as one-way functions.
However, classical one-way functions may not be hard against quantum ad-
versaries. (For example, factoring and discrete log are not hard in the quantum
case[29].) Finding a good candidate for a one-way function secure against quan-
tum adversaries is an important open problem.
On the other hand, the unique properties of quantum mechanics allow the
implementation of certain cryptographic tasks without any computational as-
sumptions. (The security proof is based only on the validity of quantum mechan-
ics.) The most famous example is the quantum key distribution[4, 5, 22, 24, 30].
The question is: can we replace the computational assumptions of the classical
case by information-theoretic security in the quantum case for the coin flipping?
For bit commitment (a related cryptographic primitive), this is impossible[20,
21, 23]1. The ideas of this impossibility proof can be used to show that there is
no quantum protocol for perfect quantum coin flipping (quantum coin flipping
with bias 0) [21, 25]. However, this still leaves the possibility that there might
be quantum protocols with an arbitrarily small bias ǫ > 0.
The first positive result was by Aharonov et.al.[2] who gave a protocol for
quantum coin flipping in which a dishonest party cannot force a given outcome
with probability more than 0.9143...
There has been some effort to construct more complicated protocols which
would achieve arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. At least two protocols have been proposed:
by Mayers et.al.[25] and by Zhang et.al.[35]. None of them had provable security
guarantees but both were conjectured to achieve an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0 for
an appropriate choice of parameters. Both of them were eventually broken: the
protocol of [25] was broken by [13, 18, 33]2 and the protocol of [35] is insecure
because of our Theorem 5.
In this paper, we give a simple protocol in which a dishonest party cannot
achieve one outcome with probability more than 0.75.
Then, we show that our protocol is optimum in a certain class of protocols
that includes our protocol, the protocol of [2] and other similar protocols.
Our third result (Theorem 5) shows that, if there is a protocol with an
arbitrarily small bias ǫ > 0, it must use a non-constant number of rounds of
communication (not just communicate many qubits in a constant number of
rounds). Namely, a coin flipping algorithm with a bias ǫ needs to have at least
Ω(log log 1ǫ ) rounds. In particular, this means that the parallel repetition fails for
quantum coin flipping. (One cannot decrease the bias arbitrarily by repeating
the protocol in parallel many times.)
Related work. We have recently learned that two of results in this paper
(the 0.75 protocol and the matching lower bound for a class of protocols) have
been independently discovered by Spekkens and Rudolph [31]. Also, Kitaev [17]
1It is possible, however, to have quantum protocols for bit commitment under quantum
complexity assumptions (existence of quantum 1-way functions). See Dumais et.al.[9] and
Crepeau et.al.[8]
2The paper [33] claims to break any protocol for coin flipping but this claim is incorrect.
It does break a class of protocols which includes the one of [25], though.
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has very recently shown that, in any protocol, at least one party can achieve
one outcome with probability at least 1/
√
2 = 0.71.... Thus, our 0.75 protocol
is close to being optimal.
Curiously, Kitaev’s lower bound does not apply to a weaker version of coin
flipping. In weak coin flipping, it is known in advance that Alice wants to
bias the coin to 0 and Bob wants to bias it to 1. Then, it is enough to give
guarantees about Pr[c = 0] if Bob is honest but Alice cheats and Pr[c = 1]
if Alice is honest but Bob cheats. Protocols for weak coin flipping have been
studied by Goldenberg [11], Spekkens and Rudolph [32] and Ambainis[3]. The
best protocol [32] achieves a maximum bias of 1/
√
2. We note best lower bound
for weak coin flipping is Theorem 5 of this paper.
The role of rounds in quantum communication has been studied in a different
context (quantum communication complexity of pointer jumping) by Klauck et.
al. [26]. There is a popular survey of quantum cryptography by Gottesman and
Lo[12].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum states
We briefly introduce the notions used in this paper. For more detailed explana-
tions and examples, see [28].
Pure states: An n-dimensional pure quantum state is a vector |ψ〉 ∈ Cn of
norm 1. Let |0〉, |1〉, . . ., |n − 1〉 be an orthonormal basis for Cn. Then,
any pure state can be expressed as |ψ〉 = ∑n−1i=0 ai|i〉 for some a0 ∈ C,
a1 ∈ C, . . ., an−1 ∈ C. Since the norm of |ψ〉 is 1, |ai|2 = 1.
The simplest special case is n = 2. Then, the basis for C2 consists of two
vectors |0〉 and |1〉 and any pure state is of form a|0〉+ b|1〉, a ∈ C, b ∈ C,
|a|2 + |b|2 = 1. Such quantum system is called a quantum bit (qubit).
We often look at |ψ〉 as a column vector consisting of coefficients ai. Then,
we use 〈ψ| to denote the conjugate transpose of |ψ〉. 〈ψ| is a row vector
consisting of a∗i (complex conjugates of ai). In this notation, 〈ψ|φ〉 denotes
the inner product of ψ and φ. (If |ψ〉 = ∑ ai|i〉, |φ〉 = ∑ bi|i〉, then
〈ψ|φ〉 = ∑ a∗i bi.) |ψ〉〈φ| denotes the outer product of ψ and φ (an n× n
matrix with entries aib
∗
j ).
Mixed states: A mixed state is a classical probability distribution (pi, |ψi〉),
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1,
∑
i pi = 1 over pure states |ψi〉. The quantum system de-
scribed by a mixed state is in the pure state |ψi〉 with probability pi.
A mixed state can be also described by its density matrix ρ =
∑
i pi|ψi〉〈ψi|.
It can be shown that any density matrix has trace 1. (A trace of a matrix
is the sum of its diagonal entries.)
A quantum system can undergo two basic operations: a unitary evolution
and a measurement.
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Unitary evolution : A unitary transformation U is a linear transformation on
Ck that preserves the l2 norm (i.e., maps vectors of unit norm to vectors
of unit norm).
If, before applying U , the system was in a pure state |ψ〉, then the state
after the transformation is U |ψ〉.
If, before U , the system was in a mixed state with a density matrix ρ, the
state after the transformation is the mixed state with the density matrix
UρU †.
Projective measurements : An observable is a decomposition of Ck into
orthogonal subspaces H1, . . ., Hl: Cn = H1 ⊕H2 ⊕ . . .⊕Hl. A measure-
ment of a pure state |ψ〉 with respect to this observable gives the result
i with probability ‖Pi|ψ〉‖2 where Pi|ψ〉 denotes the projection of |ψ〉 to
the subspace Hi. After the measurement, the state of the system becomes
Pi|ψ〉
‖Pi|ψ〉‖ .
A more general class of measurements are POVMmeasurements (see [28]).
In most of this paper, it will be sufficient to consider projective measure-
ments.
2.2 Bipartite states
Bipartite states: In the analysis of quantum coin flipping protocols, we often
have a quantum state part of which is held by Alice and the other part
by Bob. For example, we can have the EPR state (the state of two qubits
1√
2
|0〉|0〉 + 1√
2
|1〉|1〉), with the first qubit held by Alice and the second
qubit held by Bob. Such states are called bipartite states.
Tracing out: If Alice measures her part, Bob’s part becomes a mixed state.
For example, if Alice measures the first qubit of the EPR state in the basis
consisting of |0〉 and |1〉, Bob’s state becomes |0〉 with probability 1/2 and
|1〉 with probability 1/2. Let ρ be the density matrix of the mixed state
that Bob gets if Alice measures her part of a bipartite state |ψ〉. Then,
we say that ρ is obtained by tracing out the Alice’s part of |ψ〉.
There are many different ways how Alice can measure (trace out) her part.
However, they all give the same density matrix ρ for Bob’s part.
Purification: Let ρ be a mixed state. Then, any pure state |ψ〉 of a larger sys-
tem that gives ρ if a part of the system is traced out is called a purification
of ρ.
2.3 Distance measures between quantum states
We use two measures of distance between quantum states (represented by den-
sity matrices): trace distance and fidelity. For more information on these (and
other) measures of distance between density matrices, see [10, 28].
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Trace distance: Let p = (p1, . . . , pk) and q = (q1, . . . , qk) be two classical
probability distributions. Then, the variational distance between p and q
is
|p− q| =
k∑
i=1
|pi − qi|.
The variational distance characterizes how well one can distinguish the
distributions p and q.
In the quantum case, the counterpart of a probability distribution is a
mixed state. The counterpart of the variational distance is the trace dis-
tance. It is defined as follows.
The trace norm of a matrix A is the trace of |A| where |A| =
√
A†A is
the positive square root of A†A. We denote the trace norm of A by ‖A‖t.
The following lemma relates the trace norm of ρ1− ρ2 (which we also call
trace distance between ρ1 and ρ2) with the variational distance between
distributions obtained by measuring ρ1 and ρ2.
Lemma 1 [1] Let pMρ1 , p
M
ρ2 be the probability distributions generated by
applying a measurement M to mixed states ρ1 and ρ2. Then, for any
(projective or POVM) measurement M, |pMρ1 −pMρ2 | ≤ ‖ρ1−ρ2‖t and there
exists a measurement M that achieves the variational distance ‖ρ1−ρ2‖t.
We can always choose the measurement M that achieves the variational
distance ‖ρ1−ρ2‖t so thatM is a projective measurement and it has just
two outcomes: 0 and 1.
Fidelity: Let |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 be two bipartite states. Let ρ1 and ρ2 be the mixed
states obtained from |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 by tracing out (measuring) Alice’s part.
Lemma 2 [21, 23] If ρ1 = ρ2, then Alice can transform |ψ1〉 into |ψ2〉 by
a transformation on her part of the state.
For example, consider the bipartite states
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |01〉),
|ψ2〉 = 1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉),
with the first qubit held by Alice and the second qubit held by Bob. If
Alice measures her qubit of |ψ1〉, Bob is left with |0〉 with a probability
1/2 and |1〉 with a probability 1/2. If Alice measures her qubit of |ψ2〉,
Bob is left with 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) with a probability 1/2 and 1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉) with
a probability 1/2. Both of those states have the same density matrix(
1/2 0
0 1/2
)
.
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By lemma 2, this means that Alice can transform |ψ1〉 into |ψ2〉. Indeed,
she can do that by applying the Hadamard transform H to her qubit.
A generalization of lemma 2 is: if the two density matrices ρ1 and ρ2 are
close, then Alice can transform |ψ1〉 into a state |ψ′1〉 that is close to |ψ2〉.
In this case, the distance between the two density matrices is measured
by the fidelity F (ρ1, ρ2). The fidelity is defined as
F (ρ1, ρ2) = max|ψ1〉,|ψ2〉
|〈ψ1|ψ2〉|2,
over all choices of |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 that give density matrices ρ1 and ρ2 when
a part of system is traced out.
Lemma 3 [15] Let ρ1, ρ2 be two mixed states with support in a Hilbert
space H, K any Hilbert space of dimension at least dim(H), and |φi〉 any
purifications of ρi in H⊗K. Then, there is a local unitary transformation
U on K that maps |φ2〉 to |φ′2〉 = I ⊗ U |φ2〉 such that
|〈φ1|φ′2〉|2 = F (ρ1, ρ2).
Lemma 4 [34]
F (ρ1, ρ2) =
[
Tr
(√√
ρ1ρ2
√
ρ1
)]2
.
Relation between trace distance and fidelity: The trace distance and the
fidelity are closely related. If ρ1 and ρ2 are hard to distinguish for Bob,
then Alice can transform |ψ1〉 into a state close to |ψ2〉 and vica versa.
Quantitatively, this relation is given by
Lemma 5 [10] For any two mixed states ρ1 and ρ2,
1−
√
F (ρ1, ρ2) ≤ 1
2
‖ρ1 − ρ2‖t ≤
√
1− F (ρ1, ρ2).
In particular, F (ρ1, ρ2) = 0 if and only if ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖t = 2.
3 A protocol with bias 0.25
Protocol: Define
|φb,x〉 =


1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉 if b = 0, x = 0
1√
2
|0〉 − 1√
2
|1〉 if b = 0, x = 1
1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|2〉 if b = 1, x = 0
1√
2
|0〉 − 1√
2
|2〉 if b = 1, x = 1
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1. Alice picks a uniformly random b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ {0, 1} and sends |φb,x〉
to Bob.
2. Bob picks a uniformly random b′ ∈ {0, 1}, sends b′ to Alice.
3. Alice sends b and x to Bob, he checks if the state that he received from
Alice in the 1st step is |φb,x〉 (by measuring it in with respect to in a basis
consisting of |φb,x〉 and two vectors orthogonal to it)3. If the outcome of
the measurement is not |φb,x〉, he has caught Alice cheating and he stops
the protocol.
4. Otherwise, the result of the coin flip is b⊕ b′.
Theorem 1 The bias of this protocol is 0.25.
Proof: We bound the probability of dishonest Alice (or dishonest Bob) achiev-
ing b ⊕ b′ = 0. The maximum probability of achieving b ⊕ b′ = 1 is the same
because the protocol is symmetric.
Case 1: Alice is honest, Bob cheats. If b = 0, Alice sends a mixed state that
is equal to 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) with probability 1/2 and 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉) with probability
1/2. If b = 1, she sends a mixed state that is equal to 1√
2
(|0〉 + |2〉) with
probability 1/2 and 1√
2
(|0〉 − |2〉) with probability 1/2. The density matrices of
these two mixed states are
ρ0 =

 12 0 00 12 0
0 0 0

 ρ1 =

 12 0 00 0 0
0 0 12


and ‖ρ0 − ρ1‖t = 1. By Theorem 3 of [2], the probability that Bob achieves
b = b′ is at most 12 +
‖ρ0−ρ1‖t
4 =
3
4 .
Case 2: Bob honest, Alice cheats.
Let ρ be the density matrix of the state sent by Alice in the 1st step. The
first step of the proof is to “symmetrize” Alice’s strategy so that it becomes
easier to bound her success probability.
Lemma 6 There is a strategy for dishonest Alice where the state sent by Alice
in the 1st round has the density matrix of the form
ρ′ =

 1− δ1 − δ2 0 00 δ1 0
0 0 δ2

 (1)
for some δ1 and δ2 and Alice achieves b = b
′ with the same probability.
3For example, if b = x = 0, then Bob could measure in the basis |φ00〉 =
1√
2
|0〉 + 1√
2
|1〉,
1√
2
|0〉 − 1√
2
|1〉, |2〉.
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Proof: Let U0 = I,
U1 =

 1 0 00 −1 0
0 0 1

 U2 =

 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 −1


U3 =

 1 0 00 −1 0
0 0 −1

 .
Assume that Alice, before sending the state |ψ〉 to Bob in the 1st round, applies
Ui to it and, then, in the 3
rd round, replaces each description of |φb,x〉 by a
description of Ui|φb,x〉. Then, Alice achieves the outcomes 0 and 1 and gets
caught with the same probabilities as before because
(a) For all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ {0, 1}, Ui|φb,x〉 is either |φb,0〉 or
|φb,1〉, and
(b) For any |ψ〉, the inner product between Ui|ψ〉 and Ui|φb,x〉 is the same as
the inner product between |ψ〉 and |φb,x〉.
Probabilities of obtaining 0, 1 and getting caught also stay the same if Alice
picks a uniformly random i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and then applies Ui to both the state
sent in the 1st round and the description sent in the 3rd round. In this case, the
density matrix of the state sent by Alice in the 1st round is ρ′ = 14 (U0ρU
†
0 +
U1ρU
†
1 + U2ρU
†
2 + U3ρU
†
3 ). For every j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j 6= k, (UiρU †i )jk is equal
to ρjk for two i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and to −ρjk for the two other i. Therefore, ρ′jk = 0
for all j 6= k, i.e. ρ′ is of the form (1).
Lemma 7 For “symmetrized” Alice’s strategy, the probability that Alice con-
vinces Bob that b = 0 is at most F (ρ′, ρ0).
Proof: Let
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ai|i〉|ψi〉 (2)
be the purification of ρ′ chosen by Alice if she want to convince Bob that b = 0.
For every |ψi〉, Alice sends to Bob a description of a state |ψ′i〉 which is one of
|φb,x〉, b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ {0, 1}.
Alice is trying to convince Bob that b = 0. Therefore, we can assume
that she always sends to Bob a description of |φ0,0〉 or |φ0,1〉. (Replacing a
description of |φ1,x〉 by a description of |φ0,x〉 can only increase the probability
of Bob accepting b = 0, although it may simultaneously increase the probability
of Alice caught cheating.)
We pair up each state |ψi〉 with the state |ψj〉 = U1|ψi〉 and each state U2|ψi〉
with U3|ψi〉 = U2U1|ψi〉. Our “symmetrization” guarantees that
• if |ψi〉 and |ψj〉 are the two states in one pair, then ai = aj,
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• if one of states in a pair has |ψ′i〉 = |φ0,0〉, the other has |ψ′j〉 = U1|φ0,0〉 =
|φ0,1〉, and conversely,
• 〈ψi|ψ′i〉 = 〈ψj |ψ′j〉 (because performing U1 maps |ψi〉 and |ψj〉 to |ψ′i〉 and
|ψ′j〉, respectively).
Therefore, we can write the equation (2) as
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ai
(
1√
2
|i, 0〉|ψi,0〉+ 1√
2
|i, 1〉|ψi,1〉
)
(3)
with |ψ′i,0〉 = |φ0,0〉 and |ψ′i,1〉 = |φ0,1〉.
The probability that Bob accepts |ψi,x〉 as |ψ′i,x〉 is |〈ψi,x|ψ′i,x〉|2. The total
probability of Bob accepting is
∑
i
1
2
|ai|2(|〈ψi,0|ψ′i,0〉|2 + |〈ψi,1|ψ′i,1〉|2). (4)
Notice that, because of “symmetrization”, 〈ψi,0|ψ′i,0〉 = 〈ψi,1|ψ′i,1〉. Therefore,
if we define |ϕi〉 = 1√2 |i, 0〉|ψi,0〉 +
1√
2
|i, 1〉|ψi,1〉 and |ϕ′i〉 = 1√2 |i, 0〉|ψ′i,0〉 +
1√
2
|i, 1〉|ψ′i,1〉, we have 〈ϕi|ϕ′i〉 = 〈ψi,0|ψ′i,0〉 = 〈ψi,1|ψ′i,1〉. This means that (4)
is equal to ∑
i
|ai|2|〈ϕi|ϕ′i〉|2.
Let ρi be a mixed state which is |ψi,0〉 with probability 1/2 and |ψi,1〉 with
probability 1/2. Then, ρ′ =
∑
i |ai|2ρi. Since |ϕi〉 and |ϕ′i〉 are purifications of
ρi and ρ0, we have |〈ϕi|ϕ′i〉|2 ≤ F (ρi, ρ0) and∑
i
|ai|2|〈ϕi|ϕ′i〉|2 ≤
∑
i
|ai|2F (ρi, ρ).
By concavity of fidelity [28],∑
i
|ai|2F (ρi, ρ0) ≤ F (
∑
i
|ai|2ρi, ρ0) = F (ρ, ρ0).
Lemma 8 The probability that Alice achieves b ⊕ b′ = 0 (or, equivalently, b ⊕
b′ = 1) is at most 12 (F (ρ
′, ρ0) + F (ρ′, ρ1)).
Proof: With probability 1/2, Bob’s bit is b′ = 0. Then, to achieve b ⊕ b′ = 0,
Alice needs to convince him that b = 0. By Lemma 7, she succeeds with
probability at most F (ρ′, ρ0).
With probability 1/2, Bob’s bit is b′ = 1. Then, Alice needs to convince
Bob that b = 1 and she can do that with probability F (ρ′, ρ1). The overall
probability that Alice succeeds is 12 (F (ρ
′, ρ0) + F (ρ′, ρ1)).
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By Lemma 4,
F (ρ′, ρ0) = [Tr(
√√
ρ′ρ0
√
ρ′)]2 =
(
1√
2
√
1− δ1 − δ2 + 1√
2
√
δ1
)2
.
Similarly, F (ρ′, ρ1) = ( 1√2
√
1− δ1 − δ2 + 1√2
√
δ2)
2. Therefore,
1
2
(F (ρ′, ρ0) + F (ρ′, ρ1))
= (
1√
2
√
1− δ1 − δ2 + 1√
2
√
δ1)
2 + (
1√
2
√
1− δ1 − δ2 + 1√
2
√
δ2)
2
=
1
2
(
(1 − δ1 − δ2) + δ1
2
+
δ2
2
+
√
1− δ1 − δ2(
√
δ1 +
√
δ2)
)
. (5)
Let δ = δ1+δ22 . The convexity of the square root implies that
√
δ1 +
√
δ2 ≤ 2
√
δ
and (5) is at most
1
2
(
1− δ + 2
√
δ(1− 2δ)
)
.
Taking the derivative of this expression shows that it is maximized by δ = 16 .
Then, it is equal to 12 (1− 16 + 46 ) = 34 .
4 Lower bound for 3 rounds
We show a lower bound for a class of 3 round protocols which includes the
protocol of section 3 and the protocol of [2]. This class is defined by fixing the
structure of the protocol and varying the choice of states |φb,x〉.
Let X0 and X1 be two sets and π0 and π1 be probability distributions over
X0 and X1, respectively. Assume that, for every b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ Xb we have
a state |φb,x〉.
1. Alice picks a uniformly random b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, she picks x ∈ Xb
according to the distribution πb and sends |φb,x〉 to Bob.
2. Bob picks a random b′ ∈ {0, 1}, sends b′ to Alice.
3. Alice sends b and x to Bob. Bob checks if the state that he received in
the 1st step is |φb,x〉.
4. The result of the coin flip is b⊕ b′.
Theorem 2 Any protocol of this type has a bias at least 0.25.
Proof: Let ρ0 and ρ1 be the density matrices sent by an honest Alice if b = 0
and b = 1, respectively. (These density matrices are mixtures of |φb,x〉 over
x ∈ Xi.)
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Lemma 9 Bob can achieve 0 with probability 12 +
‖ρ0−ρ1‖t
4 .
Proof: By Lemma 1, there is a measurement M that, applied to ρ0 and ρ1,
produces two probability distributions with the variational distance between
them equal to ‖ρ0−ρ1‖t and it can be chosen so that there are just two outcomes:
0 and 1.
Let p0 and 1 − p0 be the probabilities of outcomes 0 and 1 when the mea-
surement M is applied to ρ0. For the variational distance to be ‖ρ0− ρ1‖t, the
probabilities of outcomes 0 and 1 when the measurement M is applied to ρ1
have to be p0 − ‖ρ0−ρ1‖t2 and 1− p0 + ‖ρ0−ρ1‖t2 .
Bob applies the measurement M to the state that he receives from Alice
and sends b = 0 if the measurement gives 0 and b = 1 if the measurement gives
1. Since an honest Alice chooses a = 0 with probability 1/2 and a = 1 with
probability 1/2, Bob achieves a = b (and a⊕ b = 0) with probability
1
2
p0 +
1
2
(
1− p0 + ‖ρ0 − ρ1‖t
2
)
=
1
2
+
‖ρ0 − ρ1‖t
4
.
Lemma 10 Alice can achieve 0 with probability
1
2
+
√
F (ρ0, ρ1)
2
.
Proof: First, we consider an honest Alice which does the protocol on a quantum
level. That means that she flips a classical coin to determine a ∈ {0, 1} and
then prepares the superposition
|ψa〉 =
∑
i∈Xa
√
πa(i)|i〉|φa,i〉
and sends the second part of the superposition to Bob. After receiving b from
Bob, she measures i and sends a and i to Bob.
The pure states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are purifications of the density matrices ρ0
and ρ1. By Lemma 3, there is a unitary transformation U on the Alice’s part
of ψ1 such that |〈ψ0|U(ψ1)〉2 = F (ρ0, ρ1).
Let α be such that F (ρ0, ρ1) = cos
2 α. Then, 〈ψ0|U(ψ1)〉 = cosα. This
means that { |ψ0〉 = cos α2 |ϕ0〉+ sin α2 |ϕ1〉
U |ψ1〉 = cos α2 |ϕ0〉 − sin α2 |ϕ1〉
for some states |ϕ0〉, |ϕ1〉.
A dishonest Alice prepares |ϕ0〉 and sends the 2nd part to Bob. If she receives
b′ = 0 from Bob, she acts as an honest quantum Alice who has prepared |ψ0〉
and sent the 2nd part to Bob. (That is, she measures her part |i〉 and sends 0
and i to Bob.) Bob accepts b = 0 with probability at least4 |〈ψ0|ϕ0〉|2 = cos2 α2 .
4For a formal proof of this, define H to be the space of all bipartite states |ψ〉 such that
Bob accepts with probability 1, if Alice acts in this way. Then, |ψ0〉 ∈ H and, since the angle
between |ϕ0〉 and |ψ0〉 is
α
2
, the squared projection of |ϕ0〉 on H is at least cos2
α
2
, implying
that Bob accepts with probability at least cos2 α
2
if Alice starts with |ϕ0〉.
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If she receives b′ = 1, Alice performs U−1 on her part of |ϕ0〉 and continues
as an honest quantum Alice who has prepared |ψ1〉 (measures |i〉 and sends to
1 and i to Bob). Bob accepts b = 1 with probability
|〈U−1(ϕ0)|ψ1〉|2 = |〈ϕ0|U(ψ1)〉|2 = cos2 α
2
.
In both cases, the probability of Bob accepting b⊕b′ = 0 is cos2 α2 . Therefore,
the overall probability of b⊕ b′ = 0 is cos2 α2 as well and we have
cos2
α
2
=
1 + cosα
2
=
1 +
√
F (ρ0, ρ1)
2
.
If F (ρ0, ρ1) ≥ 14 , then, by Lemma 10, Alice can achieve a bias of
√
F (ρ0,ρ1)
2 ≥
1
4 .
If F (ρ0, ρ1) ≤ 14 , then, by Lemma 9, Bob can achieve a bias of 14‖ρ0 − ρ1‖t
and, by Lemma 5,
1
4
‖ρ0, ρ1‖t ≥ 1
2
(1−
√
F (ρ0, ρ1)) ≥ 1
4
.
5 Two standard forms for quantum protocols
We use the following “standard form” for quantum protocols.
Theorem 3 [23] If there is a protocol for quantum coin flipping with a bias at
most ǫ, there is also a protocol with bias at most ǫ in which no party makes
measurements until all communication is complete.
The main idea of the proof of Theorem 3 is that all measurements can be
delayed till the end of protocol. For more details, see Mayers [23]. This result
has been very useful for proving the impossibility of quantum bit commitment
[21, 23] and other cryptographic primitives.
A different “standard form” has been pointed out to us by Kitaev [16].
Theorem 4 [16] If there is a protocol for quantum coin flipping with a bias ǫ,
there is another protocol with bias ǫ in which only the first message from Alice
to Bob is quantum and all the other messages are classical.
The proof idea is that Alice transmits a lot of EPR pairs in the first round
and, after that, Alice and Bob can replace all quantum communication by clas-
sical communication using teleportation.
We do not use this result in our paper but we decided to mention it because it
might be useful for other purposes. The protocols of the form of Theorem 4 have
a fairly simple structure. In the first step Alice creates an entangled state with
12
Bob and then they both do operations on their qubits and communicate classical
information. Because of this simple structure, they might be easier to analyze
than general protocols. We note that this structure of a protocol somewhat
resembles the well-known LOCC (local operations and classical communication)
paradigm in the study of entanglement [27, 28].
6 The lower bound on the number of rounds
Theorem 5 Let ǫ < 1/4. Any protocol for quantum coin flipping that achieves
a bias ǫ must use Ω(log log 1ǫ ) rounds.
Assume we have a protocol for quantum coin flipping with k rounds and a
bias ǫ. By Theorem 3, we can assume that this protocol does not make any
measurements till the end of communication.
The protocol starts with a fixed starting state |ψ0〉. Then (if both players
are honest), Alice applies a unitary transformation U1, sends some qubits to
Bob, he applies U2, sends some qubits to Alice and so on. After Uk, both Alice
and Bob perform measurements on their parts. Since there is no measurements
till the communication is finished, the joint state of Alice and Bob after i steps
is a pure state |ψi〉.
At the end of protocol, Alice and Bob measure the final state to determine
the outcome of the coin flip. If both Alice and Bob follow the protocol, the two
measurements give the same result and this result is 0 with probability 1/2 and
1 with probability 1/2.
For our analysis, we decompose each of intermediate states |ψi〉 as |ψi0〉+|ψi1〉,
where |ψi0〉 is the state which leads to the outcome 0 if the rest of protocol is
applied and |ψi1〉 is the state which leads to the outcome 1 if the rest of protocol
is applied. This is done as follows.
First, we decompose the final state |ψk〉. Let |ψk0 〉 and |ψk1 〉 be the (un-
normalized) states after the final measurement if the measurement gives 0 (1).
Then, |ψk0 〉 ⊥ |ψk1 〉 and |ψk〉 = |ψk0 〉 + |ψk1 〉. Also, ‖ψk0‖2 = ‖ψk1‖2 = 12 (since a
protocol must give 0 with probability 1/2 and 1 with probability 1/2).
Next, we define |ψi0〉 = (Ui+1Ui+2 . . . Uk)−1|ψk0 〉 and |ψi1〉 = (Ui+1Ui+2 . . . Uk)−1|ψk1 〉.
Then, |ψk〉 = |ψk0 〉+ |ψk1 〉 implies |ψi〉 = |ψi0〉+ |ψi1〉.
Let ρiA,j (ρ
i
B,j) be the density matrix of Alice’s (Bob’s) part of the (normal-
ized) bipartite state
√
2|ψij〉. Let F iA (F iB) be the fidelity between ρiA,0 and ρiA,1
(ρiB,0 and ρ
i
B,1).
Our proof is based on analyzing how F iA and F
i
B change during the protocol.
We show that they must be large at the beginning, 0 at the end and, if they
decrease too fast, this creates an opportunity for cheating. This implies the
lower bound on the number of rounds.
We start with the simplest part of the proof: F iA and F
i
B must be small at
the end (i = k).
Lemma 11 F kA = F
k
B = 0.
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Proof: At the end, both Alice and Bob know the outcome of the protocol
with certainty. That means that there is a measurement of Alice’s qubits that
perfectly distinguishes |ψk0 〉 and |ψk1 〉 (i.e., this measurement gives 0 with prob-
ability 1 on |ψk0 〉 and 1 with probability |ψk1 〉). By Lemma 1, ‖ρkA,0−ρkA,1‖t = 2.
By Lemma 5, F (ρkA,0, ρ
k
A,1) must be 0.
Similarly, F kB = 0.
Second, we show that, if F 0A or F
0
B is too small, one of sides can cheat.
Lemma 12 Alice can achieve one of outcomes 0 and 1 with probability at least
1−
√
F 0A.
Proof: Since there is no communication before the start of the protocol, the
starting superposition |ψ0〉 is a tensor product |ψA〉 ⊗ |ψB〉, with Alice having
|ψA〉 and Bob having |ψB〉.
Consider the best measurement M (for Alice) that distinguishes ρ0A,0 and
ρ0A,1 (Lemma 1). Then, |ψ00〉 = |ψ00〉+ |ψ01〉, where |ψ00〉 is the remaining state
if the measurement M on |ψ00〉 gives the outcome 0 and |ψ01〉 is the remaining
state if M gives the outcome 1. Let |ψ01〉 = |ψ10〉 + |ψ11〉, with |ψ10〉 and |ψ11〉
defined similarly.
If Alice applies M to |ψ0〉 = |ψ00〉 + |ψ01〉, she either gets the outcome 0
and the remaining state |ψ′0〉 = |ψ00〉 + |ψ10〉 or 1 and the remaining state
|ψ′1〉 = |ψ01〉+ |ψ11〉. |ψ0〉 is a product state and the measurementM is applied
to Alice’s side only. Therefore, |ψ′0〉 and |ψ′1〉 (the remaining states when M
gives 0 and 1) are product states as well.
Since |ψ0〉 = |ψ′0〉 + |ψ′1〉, either ‖ψ′0‖2 ≥ 12 or ‖ψ′1‖2 ≥ 12 . For simplicity,
we assume that ‖ψ′0‖2 ≥ 12 and Alice is trying to achieve the outcome 0. (The
outcome 1 can be achieved similarly with a slightly smaller probability.)
Let |ψ′A〉 ⊗ |ψB〉 be the normalized state |ψ
′
0
〉
‖ψ′
0
‖ . To bias the coin towards 0,
Alice just runs the honest protocol with her starting state being |ψ′A〉 instead
of |ψA〉.
Let ‖ψ01‖2+‖ψ10‖2 ≤ ǫ. We show that this implies that |ψ′A〉⊗|ψB〉 is close
to the normalized state
√
2|ψ00〉 (which gives the outcome 0 with probability 1).
We have
|ψ′0〉
‖ψ′0‖
=
|ψ00〉+ |ψ10〉
‖ψ′0‖
=
|ψ00〉+ |ψ01〉
‖ψ′0‖
+
|ψ10〉 − |ψ01〉
‖ψ′0‖
.
|ψ00〉 + |ψ01〉 = |ψ00〉 leads to the outcome 0 with certainty. Therefore, the
probability of a different outcome (1 or Alice caught cheating) is at most
‖ψ10 − ψ01‖2
‖ψ′0‖2
≤ ‖ψ10‖
2 + ‖ψ01‖2
‖ψ′0‖2
≤ ǫ
1/2
= 2ǫ.
Therefore, the described strategy for dishonest Alice gives 0 with probability at
least 1− 2ǫ.
Next, we bound ‖ψ01‖2 + ‖ψ10‖2.
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Let 1− p0 and p0 be the probabilities of outcomes 0 and 1 when measuring√
2|ψi0〉. Let p1 and 1−p1 be the probabilities of 0 and 1 when measuring
√
2|ψi1〉.
Then, the variational distance between these two probability distributions is
2(1− p0− p1). Since we are using the best measurement for distinguishing ρ0A,0
and ρ0A,1, 2(1− p0 − p1) is equal to ‖ρ0A,0 − ρ0A,1‖t. By Lemma 5, this implies
1−
√
F 0A = 1−
√
F (ρ0A,0, ρ
0
A,1) ≤ ‖ρ0A,0 − ρ0A,1‖t = (1− p0 − p1)
and this is equivalent to p0 + p1 ≤
√
F 0A.
Notice that p0 = 2‖ψ01‖2 because ρ0A,0 is the density matrix of Alice’s side
of
√
2|ψ0A,0〉 and |ψ01〉 is the remaining state if the measurement of |ψ0A,0〉 gives
1. Similarly, p1 = 2‖ψ10‖2. Therefore, we have ‖ψ01‖2 + ‖ψ10‖2 ≤ 12
√
F 0A and
Alice can bias the coin to 0 with probability at least 1−
√
F 0A.
Hence, if the bias of a protocol is ǫ, then, by Definition 1, we must have
1−
√
F 0A ≤ 12 + ǫ. This implies
√
F 0A ≥ 12 − ǫ and F 0A ≥ (12 − ǫ)2. Since ǫ < 1/4,
we must have F 0A ≥ 116 .
Third, we show that, if after any round, one of F iA and F
i
B is much larger
than the other, this also creates a possibility for cheating.
Lemma 13 Let i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}. Then, there is a strategy for dishonest Alice
which achieves the result 0 with probability at least
(
1√
2
− 4
√
F iA
)2
+
(√
F iB√
2
− 4
√
F iA
)2
. (6)
Proof: For brevity, we denote F iA and F
i
B by FA and FB (omitting the index i
which is the same throughout the proof).
We first prove the FA = 0 case. This case was previously considered by
Mayers et.al.[25]. They showed that, if FA = 0 and FB > 0, then Alice can
successfully cheat. Below, we show how to formalize their argument so that it
shows the probability that Alice can achieve.
FA = 0 case. Then, (6) is just
1
2 +
FB
2 .
By Lemma 5, F (ρiA,0, ρ
i
A,1) = FA = 0 implies ‖ρiA,0−ρiA,1‖t = 2. By Lemma
1, there is a measurement for Alice that perfectly distinguishes ρiA,0 and ρ
i
A,1.
With probability 1/2, the outcome of the measurement is 0 and the joint state
of Alice and Bob after the measurement is |ψi0〉. With probability 1/2, the
outcome is 1 and the joint state of Alice and Bob becomes |ψi1〉. In the first
case, she just continues as in the honest protocol. This gives the answer 0 with
probability 1/2.
If she gets |ψi1〉, by Lemma 3, there is a unitary transformation U that can
be performed by Alice such that
|〈ψi0|U(ψi1)〉|2 = F (ρiB,0, ρiB,1)‖ψi0‖2 =
F (ρiB,0, ρ
i
B,1)
2
=
FB
2
. (7)
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Alice performs U and then continues as in the honest protocol. This gives the
answer 0 with probability at least FB/2.
Together, the probability of answer 0 is at least 12 (1 + FB).
FA ≥ 0 case. By Lemma 5, there is a measurement M for Alice that, applied
to ρiA,0 and ρ
i
A,1, produces two probability distributions with the variational
distance between them at least 2(1 − √FA). Without the loss of generality,
we can assume that this is a measurement with two outcomes 0 and 1 and the
probability of 0 is higher for ρiA,0 and the probability of 1 is higher for ρ
i
A,1.
The strategy for cheating Alice is the same as in the FA = 0 case. She
applies the measurement M and, then, if she gets 0, continues as in the honest
protocol. If she gets 1, she applies the transformation U and then continues as
in the honest protocol.
Next, we show that this strategy achieves the result 0 with the probability
given by the formula (6).
Let |ψ′0〉 and |ψ′1〉 denote the (unnormalized) remaining states when the
outcome of the measurement M is 0 and 1, respectively.
Also, let |ψab〉 (for a, b ∈ {0, 1}) denote the (unnormalized) remaining states
when |ψia〉 is measured and the outcome of the measurement is b. Since |ψi〉 =
|ψi0〉+ |ψi1〉, we have |ψ′0〉 = |ψ00〉+ |ψ10〉 and |ψ′1〉 = |ψ01〉+ |ψ11〉.
On the other hand, |ψi0〉 = |ψ00〉+ |ψ01〉 and |ψi1〉 = |ψ10〉+ |ψ11〉. Therefore,
‖ψ′0 − ψi0‖ = ‖ψ10 − ψ01‖ ≤ ‖ψ10‖+ ‖ψ01‖ ≤
√
2(‖ψ10‖2 + ‖ψ01‖2). (8)
Similarly to the proof of Lemma 12, ‖ψ10‖2 + ‖ψ01‖2 ≤ 12
√
FA. Therefore, (8)
is at most 4
√
FA. We also have ‖ψ′1 − ψi1‖ ≤ 4
√
FA with the same proof.
Let Hi0 be the set of bipartite states such that applying the rest of the
protocol (UkUk−1 . . . Ui+1) and the final measurement at the end of the protocol
gives the outcome 0 with probability 1. Then, |ψi0〉 ∈ Hi0. Also, the norm of the
projection of U(|ψi1〉) on Hi0 is at least
√
FB/2 (by (7)).
Consider the norms of the projections of |ψ′0〉 and |ψ′1〉 on Hi0. They differ
from the norms of |ψi0〉 and |ψi1〉 by at most ‖ψ′0−ψi0‖ ≤ 4
√
FA and ‖ψ′1−ψi1‖ ≤
4
√
FA. Therefore, the projection of |ψ′0〉 on Hi0 is of norm at least 1√2 −
4
√
FA and
the projection of U |ψ′1〉 is of norm at least
√
FB√
2
− 4√FA. This means that the
probability of outcome 0 is at least(
1√
2
− 4
√
FA
)2
+
(√
FB√
2
− 4
√
FA
)2
.
For the purposes of this paper, a weaker form of lemma 13 is sufficient.
Corollary 1 Let i ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}. Then, there is a strategy for dishonest Alice
which achieves the result 0 with probability at least 12 +
FB
2 − 2
√
2
√
FA.
Proof: We have (
1√
2
− 4
√
FA
)2
+
(√
FB√
2
− 4
√
FA
)2
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=(
1
2
−
√
2 4
√
FA +
√
FA
)
+
(
FB
2
−
√
2
√
FB
4
√
FA +
√
FA
)
≥
(
1
2
−
√
2 4
√
FA
)
+
(
FB
2
−
√
2 4
√
FA
)
=
1
2
+
FB
2
− 2
√
2 4
√
FA.
Corollary 2 Assume that the bias of a protocol is at most ǫ. Then, after every
round, FB ≤ 2ǫ+ 6 4
√
FA and FA ≤ 2ǫ+ 6 4
√
FB.
Proof: By Lemma 13, Alice can achieve Pr[0] = 12 +
FB
2 − 2
√
2 4
√
FA. Because
the bias of the protocol is at most ǫ, we must have FB2 − 2
√
2 4
√
FA ≤ ǫ and
FB ≤ 2ǫ+ 4
√
2 4
√
FA ≤ 2ǫ+ 6 4
√
FA.
FA ≤ 2ǫ+ 6 4
√
FB follows similarly.
Next, we use Corollary 2 to show that the fidelities F iA and F
i
B cannot
decrease too fast.
Lemma 14 Assume that a k-round protocol has the bias at most ǫ. Then, for
any i < k, F iA ≤ 14ǫ1/4
k−i−1
and F iB ≤ 14ǫ1/4
k−i−1
.
Proof: By induction on k − i.
Base case. i = k − 1.
First, remember that F kA = F
k
B = 0. Let X ∈ {A,B} be the person who
sends the message in the kth round and Y be the person who receives the mes-
sage. Sending away a part of the state can only increase the fidelity. Therefore,
F k−1X ≤ F kX = 0, i.e. F k−1X = 0.
By Corollary 2, F k−1Y ≤ 2ǫ+ 6 4
√
F k−1X = 2ǫ < 14ǫ.
Inductive case.
We assume that the lemma is true for i and show that it is also true for i−1.
Similarly to the previous case, let X be the person who sends the message in
the ith round and Y be the other person. Then,
F i−1X ≤ F iX ≤ 14ǫ1/4
k−i−1
.
By Corollary 2,
F i−1Y ≤ 2ǫ+ 6
4
√
14ǫ1/4k−i−1 ≤ (2 + 6 4
√
14)ǫ1/4
k−i
< 14ǫ1/4
k−i
.
In particular, Lemma 14 implies that F 0A ≤ 14ǫ1/4
k−1
. We also have F 0A ≥ 116
(Lemma 12 and the first paragraph after its proof). Therefore, 14ǫ1/4
k−1 ≥ 116 .
Taking log of both sides twice gives k = Ω(log log 1ǫ ).
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7 Conclusion
We have constructed a protocol for quantum coin flipping with bias 0.25 and
shown that it is optimal for a restricted class of protocols. We also gave a
general lower bound on the number of rounds needed to achieve a bias ǫ. A
stronger lower bound has been later shown by Kitaev [17] but our bound also
applies to weak coin flipping. The table below summarizes the known results
for both strong and weak coin flipping.
Best protocol Best lower bound
Strong 0.25 (this paper) 1√
2
− 12 = 0.21... [17]
Weak 1√
2
− 12 = 0.21... [32] ǫ > 0, Ω(log log 1ǫ ) rounds required
(this paper)
The bounds for strong coin flipping are quite close but weak coin flipping is
still wide open.
Another interesting question about coin flipping protocols is “cheat-sensitivity”
studied by [2, 14, 32]. A protocol is for coin flipping or other cryptographic tasks
is cheat-sensitive if a dishonest party cannot increase the probability of one out-
come without being detected with some probability. Many quantum protocols
display some cheat-sensitivity but it remains to be seen what degree of cheat-
sensitivity can be achieved.
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